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Nels F. S. Ferre
Ethics is falsely abstractive as a subject apart from the under
standing of the nature of man. In this study we are to consider the
nature of Christian motivation. Authority and motivation I consider
to be the two main problems of our present society, and not least of all
of us as educators. The Conference on Science, Philosophy and
Religion, for instance, realizing this fact, is devoting a very critical
year to the relation between authority and freedom. Great edu
cational foundations, like the Ford foundation, are intensely con
cerned with the social sciences, and particularly with the problem
of motivation in order that we might get men to do the truth which
they already know at least ideally or theoretically. By choosing this
topic we are assuredly at the heart of modern man's predicament.
How, then, does the teaching of ethics on the level of higher edu
cation contribute essentially to the solution of the problem of
motivation as well as the problem of authority?
In order to discuss this question at all adequately we must
consider the nature of man. Even though man, moreover, cannot be
considered piecemeal, but can be understood only as a whole, we
must nevertheless consider the various aspects of man which func
tion as distinctive drives within that whole. For the sake of proper
diagnosis, then, we want to discuss the nature of man, granting
that he is a whole, and using this perspective as our total reference,
even while we analyze three sub-headings: the ethics of the mind,
or ethics as truth ; the ethics of the heart, or Christ and conscience ;
the ethics of the will, or action as community.
I.
There is real danger to isolate deed from thought, ethics from
truth. There is also real danger to equate them. The Word, the
Logos, the Concept, or the Purpose becomes flesh and lives among
us, full of grace and truth. The Logos does not thereby cease to be
the Logos. The Logos can never be known in history apart from
the Kavros, the concrete enactment of the Logos in historic decision.
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but the Kairos never becomes, or can take the place of, the eternal
Logos. Truth is more a matter of being than of thinking, but be
ing is ever judged by the eternal standard of the thought which
is structured in God. The existential and the rational are involved
organically one in the other both in God and in man; and yet they
cannot be equated outright without a forfeiting of the richness of
reality.
At this very point we come to grips with the problem of man
and motivation in the most basic relation between existential and
rational ethics. Existential ethics emphasizes the decisiveness of
man's position before God. The whole man must choose directly
with regard to the absoluteness of God's will. There must be no
interference of knowledge. In this sense Kierkegaard's insistence
on the transcendence and even suspension of teleological ethics is
important. Man, according to this view, is not judged by the
accumulation of man's standards, but by the eternal will of God
which transcends human knowing. Knowledge is of the past, secon
dary. Obedience is of the present, primary. Religion can be sub
ject to no rational or historic structures. No norms of eternity are
given to man. History is unrepeatable. Each situation is unique.
Man confronts the direct commands of God to which he must say
yes or no. He can never translate his choices into past wisdom.
Precedents cannot ever take the place of the command to go
wherever God, who is high and lifted up, sends us, for He calls us
forth into an ever unknown land of obedience. From history we
learn nothing. Christ is our contemporary. Ours is to be disciples
at first hand. Ours it is to live by faith, and not by sight. Such is
the position of consistent neo-orthodoxy. God's revelation is in
terms of events in history, in decisions through which His will
becomes known, or in terms of encounter divine and human, and
not in terms of philosophical or ethical abstractions. Christian
ethics, this school of thought avers, dealing with the whole man
before God in the present moment of decision, is a matter of exis
tential, not of rational ethics. Christian ethics is subjective and
individual and not objective and social.
The rationalist replies that such a conception of ethics removes
the sovereignty of God as truth. The Holy Spirit, for the ration
alist, is defined as the Spirit of truth. Truth is a matter of reality,
and of norms inherent in that reality which we can know and obey.
Apart from such knowledge ethics becomes capricious and haphaz-
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ard. Existential ethics avoids social judgment because it is individ
ualistic. It avoids rational judgment because it is arbitrarily sub
jective. To the rationalist ethics must be a matter of coherent liv
ing and coherent concern. The individual must himself be self-
consistent, but he must also be consistent with the need of others.
The individual and society alike must be subject to the standard
truths of reality in terms of which all are judged.
Ethics, indeed, is truth, but truth is not only a matter of
selecting but of seeing, not only a matter of obedience of choice
but of the obedience of the mind. Unless it is possible for us to
learn from history and from systematic thought, we cannot find
out for ourselves what the truth is or what true conduct is. We
are then indeed doomed to authoritarianism; our ethics has be
come heteronomous. History is the accumulation of man's experi
ence before God through which we learn; and systematic thought
is the means by which we organize and make available for ourselves
the heritage of the ages. But in all instances the truth must be cap
able of being seen. We have revelation, not mystery, as the essence
of the faith. Even in conduct we must worship the Lord our God
with all our minds. Decision there must be, but decision is not
apart from knowledge, and not apart from social norms, but is
rather in accordance with our best knowledge and social standards.
So claim the rationalists in ethics.
What is the truth with respect to the relation between the
existential and the rational teaching of ethics? The nature of that
truth in a large measure determines the kind of motivation which
is consistent with an ethics based on reality. The true relation can
be understood only if we consider again the relation of kairos to
logos and of decision to thought. The first relation deals with the
superstructure within which and in relation to which man finally
decides; the second relation deals with the nature of man with
respect to the operation of truth as standard and as whole-response.
No totally pure meaning is possible to history. Pure meaning
is the prerogative of God alone. History is touched everywhere
with finitude and in great measure with sin. Historic existence is
kairic. The Logos is always seen only within the imperfections of
history. Even the Word comes incognito within the weaknesses
of the flesh. Therefore rational principles or moral norms in the
form of universally valid thought or action are impossible. Every
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rational or moral norm is abstracted from imperfect history by
imperfect people. To be usable in the concrete world it must also
be re-applied to an imperfect situation.
Both imperfection and sin characterize history as a whole.
Rationalism tends to absolutize an abstraction. This abstraction
becomes in effect its god to be worshipped as the ultimate fount
of being and of right. Truth for thought and conduct is never like
gold in a mine that can be pulled out and refined. Truth is rather
like the tough fabric for thought and action that underlies and
interweaves with all reality. The deeper and fuller the truth the
more concrete and correlative it becomes. The depths of background
both enrich the pattern and thwart its intellectualistic oversimpli
fication. Truth can be simple as generality of pattern for thought
or conduct, but truth for life is always profoundly complex. The
deeper the full involvement of any moral action the less clear and
unambiguous it becomes.
Why is this? The reason for this fact is that history is ambi
guous precisely in order to produce and insure our ethical reality
and freedom. If the Logos were unambiguous man would, indeed,
always choose the best. At this point Socrates is surely right. If
there were no problem outside of man and no darkness within, man
would simply do the will of God. But he would do so as a puppet.
Unless man eats of the tree of good and evil, he can never see God,
or be like God, for the good is good only to a moral creature. No
morality is possible, however, without freedom. Nor is freedom
possible without ambiguity in terms of which man learns to know
the difference between right and wrong by means of the observation
in his own actual experience of the difference between good and
bad consequences. God made this kind of a world where the Logos
as the direct light is inaccessible to man exactly in order that man
through his own kairos, or actual decisions within his own chronos,
might find out for himself that God's way is best. Lacking full
sight, man must live by faith. There is no application of the con
clusive Kairos, the Logos become flesh, except through acts of
faith. Such acts alone accumulate the background of ethical insight
through which man can freely choose the way of God as his own.
Yet for such historic accumulation of ethical choices from
which to learn there must also be cumulative meaning. Even though
the Logos cannot become pure principle in history, nevertheless,
history cannot be lighted apart from Him. Only within the living
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Word which is the love of God made flesh can meaning find the
unity which fully extends throughout the whole universe. In Him
is the maximum explanatory adequacy. In Him all things cohere,
and only in Him. The structure for right action is, in the final
analysis, not a network of consistent thoughts, but is rather a con
sistent pattern of love. We cannot imitate a person as such without
forfeiting our maturity. Nor can we embody abstract principles
which are too brittle and too inflexible to fit the myriad complexity
of ever shifting life. But we can imitate a pattern of conduct, and
walk in love as beloved children even as Christ loved us and gave
himself for us.
Without a final Logos which can be increasingly approximat
ed without ever being attained, we cannot know the dependability
of the love of God both as stability and as creativity. The flexible
fullness of God's love is definite without being specific, even as
a child should be able to trust its own mother completely without
knowing what that love is going to reveal over the years ahead,
far beyond the child's present imagination or intellectual relevance.
Existential ethics removes the stability of propositional truth:
the perspective and proportion of the Logos at any one time and
by any person or group; rational ethics removes the dynamic,
creative, transcendent nature of the Logos whereby it can never
be reduced to mere principles apart from concrete historic deci
sions. Truth is, thus, from life and for life, but, even so, from
beyond our own kind of life, judging, guiding and saving it. Exis
tential ethics removes the height and the hope of the ideal; ra
tional ethics compresses life into premade molds which cannot
contain it. The Christian ethics combines the two into ethics as
truth and truth as ethics. The Word becomes living, but yet life
itself cannot be attained apart from the Word. The absolute mean
ing is entertained by the event and helps to create it, but whenever
the meaning becomes deed the content of meaning becomes express
ed within the finite, and usually within the sin-touched, form of
human history.
As far as human nature goes, ethics must be a matter of truth
because moral truth can be entertained only by those who dare have
it. Moral truth is more a matter of daring life, of concerned ac
ceptance, than it is a matter of intellectual finding or formulation.
Our theoretical reason, like great notions, goes way back to history
and continues as a network into the present. Regardless of any
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individual man's acceptance of it, that history persists through
books and other objective records. Thus theoretical thoughts and
norms survive. As far as life goes, however, we live largely by our
practical reason which is the enlightenment of our purposes. The
whole of life puts pressure on the self to have the reasoning of
that self confirm its choices. The whole-self pressures thinking
in order to force it into confirming its deepest commitments. Such
pressure on thinking may also be powerfully enforced by public
opinion.
The theoretical or objective reason may convict us of false
hood or guilt, but only provided that we are ready and willing to
let it. The practical reason as the agent of the total self is always
in the saddle. The theoretical reason as the agent of God and men,
our trans-perspectival reason so to speak, is necessary both for our
growth and our more radical change, like conversion, but the
practical reason, the whole man thinking, is ever dominant. This
fact makes it obvious why we can say that while the sinner ration
alizes the saint alone reasons. It is by reason of the dominance of
the whole-self that truth cannot be had apart from ethical com
mitment and insight. Not only therefore is truth ethical, but ethics
is truth in this partial, but, nevertheless, exceedingly important
sense. Certainly this incontrovertible fact deals a mortal blow to
the cult of objectivity which presupposes that truth can be had in
the moral, spiritual and social realms in terms of objective descrip
tion apart from the preconditions of subjective commitment to the
content of truth as social concern. To be uncommitted to truth as
common concern is to be committed to the falsehood of a truth
which does not demand such commitment.
II
Our first point declared that ethics is the precondition
for the knowing of truth, whereas that ethics itself can
neither be understood nor attained apart from total truth.
The mind is more than the capacity for the awareness
of facts and for logical inference. The mind is the
instrument of interpretation of the total self and is consequently
governed by the nature and deepest decisions of that self. What
truth we can find depends greatly upon the truth that we dare. In
the same way, "the heart" is more than the affective states of the
self. The affective states are intertwined with the ideas and the
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ideals which motivate the self and are themselves also fed by the
actions of the self as will. The self as a whole chooses, as we shall
see, but in the light of ideas which move him and in terms of feel
ings which give positive or negative meanings to those ideas. The
self interacts with the universe, interpreting the interactions through
his mind, relating himself to the universe in terms of pleasant or
unpleasant feelings, which are then stored in memories associated
with the ideas which refer to his actual experiences of a real world.
The ideas associated with real event-references have not only
feeling associations; they also become linked up with feelings as
to the rightness or wrongness of any given course of action. One
aspect of man's image of God in him is this capacity to experience
acts as right or wrong, through a cumulative, complex feeling reac
tion which is called the conscience. Such feeling responses includ
ing conscience are organic to man and therefore inhere in his 'total
self-environment relation. They can be acquired, and are generally
so acquired, only because they are constituent to his nature as a
human being. Beginnings of such right-or-wrong reactions are to
be found in animals, but these have no free ideas sufficiently
developed to enable them to have the delayed responses of freedom
which alone makes actions moral. As a moral being on this level,
man is, indeed, a unique creature. Much dispute has raged around
the nature of conscience. Some hold this to be the voice of God
to be heeded at all times. Others believe it to be a natural accumula
tion of social and individual experience, invariably relative in
nature. Our decision as to the interpretation of conscience con
ditions our view on adequate motivation.
The Christian view of ethics depends upon our understanding
of the nature of man. The nature of man is largely determined by
our understanding of the ethics of "the heart," or the relation of
Christ to conscience. A good deal of our grasp of motivation as
well as authority is consequently dependent upon the relation of
conscience to Christ. Let us therefore go on to outline the nature
of conscience before the advent of law, under the law, and as made
free within the Gospel of Christ.
Man's conscience before the advent of, or apart from, the
Hebrew Christian law has both form and content. The form of
conscience is the dynamic sense of right which characterizes human
nature everywhere and is, as such, the same before and after the
coming of the law and the prophets. The content varies a good deal
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but is always a matter of right relations between self, society and
nature. Social reference seems to be in terms of self-fulfilment,
of obligation to others and in terms of an urge to altruism or to
self-giving.
Naturally such content is mostly situational. Man cannot
escape the basic aspects of his actual situation : self, others, and
nature; but if organic need means constituent relation, even the
most primitive religions have ethical content which is the same
in structure as the later ani more developed conscience. The self
as such is torn between concern for self ; duty to others and desire
for them ; the desire to give of self ; and a longing to be on right
terms, even on friendly terms, with the environment, in whatever
terms this is then interpreted. Conscience is not apart from social
context and from natural situations. As a drive to be right and
to be accepted on friendly terms conscience transcends the self,
society and nature as a universal unfulfilled occurrence, pointing
thus beyond its own nature as content to the universal content which
alone can satisfy it.
Conscience under the law is man's attempt to fulfil, by his own
efforts, the laws of right relations, as he understands them, and
thus to avoid guilt by the effecting of friendly as well as of right
relations. Part of this striving is due to man's desire to be his best
self and in as right relations as possible to the world outside him
self. As such the striving is noble. Much in primitive religions and
in religions of law is to be profoundly admired. We do no service
either to God or to man by painting natural man, or man
under the law, as black as possible. God has made us for
himself and the deepest desire of our lives reflects that fact. But
much religion under law, on the other hand, is the attempt to be
self-sufficient at the point of pride. Such pride may arise either
from insecurity and dread or from aggressive drives. Both result
from a lack of self-acceptance. The self dares not accept himself
under the high Hebrew Christian law of full love to God and to
neighbor precisely because he knows that he can never fulfil this
and thus he tries to escape becoming inevitably guilty.
In order to prevent a sense of guilt the self may rather accept
certain parts of the law, or certain symbols of it, as the ones to
keep, and by the keeping of them may feel consciously safe or even
proud, whereas deep down underneath it all he may feel guilty and
uncertain to a far larger degree than we suppose. Moralism is
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either earnest or complacent, but both forms of the problem indi
cate a deep, inner insecurity. Both a convicting conscience and a
dull conscience are signs of guilt and unhappiness. Men have to
live and they therefore adjust themselves practically to the de
mands of those laws which they accept as actually for them, but,
all the same, there is no real release from the pressures of moral
obligation in the face of an unfulfilled law or from the guilt which
comes from man's total impotence before the judgment throne of
a law which is too hard to keep. Conscience under the law is a
director of right relations. It is, however, the judgment of the in
ternalized law which insists subconsciously on a guilt which is in
escapable.
Therefore conscience needs to be freed by Qirist. Christ is
the truth of the law fulfilled by love, not through man's power
but through God's grace. Man finds freedom through a new re
lationship where God freely bestows a righteousness not of man's
making. This freedom is what Tillich calls "the transmoral con
science," the transcendence of the moral ambiguities of actual
actions by a new righteousness and within a new experience of
justification by the grace of God. Such freedom centers in the
experience of forgiveness based on God's grace in Christ, not on
man's merit. Faith removes guilt; the removal of guilt removes
frustration; and the removal of frustration cuts the ground under
anxiety. The forgiveness of sin by the grace of God through faith
in Christ may seem old-time terminology, but the experience as
well as the interpretation is more genuine than any less realistic
substitute for it.
The conscience that is freed by Christ has power, for it has
received a new discourse of meaning and motivation. Faith en
genders feelings of satisfaction on a new level of reality. Christ
achieves for divided and confused man a new kind of integration.
Faith as the existential affirmation of the love of God casts out
fear. Faith fosters genuineness. Therefore the martyrs dared to
face death with joy and expectation. Faith is the secret of motiva
tion�faith in Christ as the enacted love of God in history�for
faith takes possession of the whole self. Man's faith is his deepest
self. Thus faith clarifies the mind and constrains the mind with
divine power.
Echics thus becomes settled in truth. Conduct becomes truth
in action by the whole self. When the whole self is rooted and
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grounded in love, he becomes strengthened with might by the Spirit
in the inner man. The conscience which is freed by Christ finds re
lease from conflict, thus releasing also the satisfactions of crea
tive commitment and achievement. Emotions may be interpreted by
some as due to frustration, but there are genuine states of well
being affectively experienced, as well, which fulfil the inner needs
of the creature both with regard to himself and with regard to
fullness of satisfactory relationships with his environment. Even
when the secondary social environment ignores or is hostile to the
new man in Christ he can glory in all his afflictions, because his
permanent basis of satisfaction is his relation to the will of God.
Even when our minds are mixed up about specific moral issues
or when no good choice seems open to us, those who have learned to
trust in Christ and who act in faith in God's grace know that Christ
is greater than ot-r conscience.
The conscience as such can never be the standard for Christian
conduct, for conscience is only the empirical content of the image
of God. The image has within it an absolute quality, since it truly
reflects man's coming from God and his need for Him. But the
image itself has no content. It is a reflection and not a reality. The
content is filled in by experience; by parental influence and teach
ing, by what we learn in school and with friends, and by what we
ourselves experience through the medium of previous experience.
Human experience, being partly free and ambiguous, has a varied
interpretation both as to truth and as to right. The content is there
fore by itself relative, but in relation to an absolute urge in the
form and to whatever absolute content underlies, or is mixed in,
with the relation. We know always with relation to the absolute,
directly or indirectly, and therefore this has never left itself with
out witness.
But Christ as Agape demanding an inclusive and concerned
community under God, is the only standard for the Christian con
science. All matters of faith and all doctrines of life and work
which are contrary to, or less than, this fully inclusive community
of the common concern under God as the only claimant for our full
allegiance are therefore to be judged wrong by Christ as the divine
content of conscience. Particularly He reveals as evil our narrow
allegiances which are camouflaged as loyalties to concrete causes,
but which actually contain destructive overagainstness within that
loyalty. If Methodism or Calvinism, or any other ism, however
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lofty, is our most concretely compelling loyalty, our conscience
fails of Christian criterion as constraining motivation. Only the
heart made truly whole by Christ's love can give man a mind which
is not flesh, experiencing fear and death, but which is Ufe, ex
periencing life and peace.
Ill
Thus the mind can become free to think on account of our
doing of the truth. He that wills to do the will of God alone can
know the doctrine. Only the heart that knows the concern of Christ
can find the peace that passes understanding. Christian ethics is thus
the clue to peace of mind and peace of heart. But the primary part
of man is his will, for this is the self in action. The self is larger
than the will, for the self can have a "weak" will, as for instance,
when the self chooses in line with outside temptations. When such
a choice is made, however, the mind and the feelings are in large
measure conflicting aspects. The self, contrariwise, can also have
a "strong" will, where it chooses contrary to the objective good it
sees, out of self-will, the mind and the feelings again registering
protest. But after all the will is the self actively choosing, whether
to do or not to do, or what side to take or reject.
Under this last topic of the ethics of the will, or action as
community, we can touch on two topics only: the imago dei and
conversion ; and the imago dei and sanctification. At these two
points we come to grips with the different approaches of liberalism
and Christianity, and neo-orthodoxy and Christianity. My strong
feeling is that both liberalism and neo-orthodoxy have missed the
power of Christian ethics as man's most important motivation, the
former through a lack of understanding of the necessity of the
new birth ; the second through a lack of understanding of the neces
sity of sanctification.
If the problems of ethics are basically the problems of author
ity and motivation, I believe that we have made a basic mistake
in not accepting the teaching of Jesus that we must be born again,
Man is born with the image of God, but not with God in him. Man
is created with the reflection of God as the basis of his nature,
but not with the reality of God as constituting his nature. In order
for man to become whole and to become a spontaneously moral
individual, he must have the reflection exchanged or fulfilled by
the reality. The tree must become good for him to bear the fruits
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of the spirit. In order for motivation to become Christian con
cern, man must be born again.
For the sake of understanding this fact we should know that
the reality of God is love or Agape while the image of God is al
truism. Man's altruism reflects but does not contain the reality
of God's Agape. The essential nature of man is his creation by
God and his relations to him. Man's essential nature is, there
fore, his divine potential. Man's actual nature, on the other hand,
is dominantly sinful or set on self. Such sinfulness is not total in
the perspective of the natural man. Natural man can know and do
much good, even altruistically, i. e., through outgoing concern and
self-renunciation. By nature man knows the good to a large extent,
even his conscience bearing witness to this fact. Not to admit this
truth is to be parochially defensive. Christian faith can be nothing
less than equal to all truth if its God is the sovereign love with
relation to whom all must be explained, judged and saved. Such
sinfulness, or being set on self, is total, however, in the sense that
in his own power man can never find the power of salvation. It
is total in the locus of justification. No man can ever keep the
whole law and, therefore, under the law, man as man is irreparably
guilty. This is a fact, and total depravity, in this sense, is true.
Did God, then, put us under an impossible law in order for Him
to show off His own power and glory, to make Him feel superior
and generous by saving us through grace? God forbid! Again we
say, God forbid!
God put us under the law in order for us to see the impossi
bility and unsatisfactory nature of our attempts at self-centeredness
and self-sufficiency. In order to make us free, God first made us
stubbornly self-centered. Thus we cannot become puppets or quali
fications of the absolute. But, in order to keep us ever dissatisfied
with our self-centeredness, God gave us a drive of duty towards
others along with a drive of desire for others. Self-centeredness is
therefore misery and leaves us frustrated and restless. Sin never
satisfies the true self. The law convicts us, both by duty and by
desire, that self-centeredness is wrong as well as unsatisfactory.
Above all, God put eternity into our hearts. He made us for Him
self. His image is our deepest essential motivation, though, for
the sake of our individuation and growth in freedom, our actual
motivation is towards self and towards relevantly limited group
loyalties.
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Altruism craves Agape in which Eros is fulfilled and Philia
is sanctified. Only by the acceptance of Agape, of God Himself
and of His will for the common good, can we find satisfaction for
the total self. Such regeneration means a redirection whereby God
becomes primary in our lives and whereby the total fellowship
actually motivates us as naturally as our drive to self, apart from
or over against others, did before. The self which craves to be
served and glorified by others must give way to a self constrained
by the love of God to serve others and seek their glory. The self
as such can never find power over self. He can become increasingly
socialized. But to become a heavenly citizen he must be naturalized
there. His whole life must be changed. He must be born again.
Altruism cannot attain to Agape, but altruism can reject as adequate
any other solution for the problem of self than the finding of the
new meaning and motivation which inhere in the concern of Christ.
Conversion, however affected, is thus realism. God must turn us,
as the Psalmist said, if we are to be turned. Regeneration is a
prerequisite for a Christian ethics. Without this act of grace there
can be no distinctly Christian ethics to experience or to teach.
For a man to find the new will which prpduces by its very
nature the fruits of the Spirit he must thus be born again. By
grace are we saved and that not of ourselves ; this state is the
gift of God's love in Christ Jesus through the indwelling of the
Spirit. In what sense, however, does altruism adequately repre
sent the image of God? Does altruism constitute the full nature
of man as God's creature? Can ethics do away entirely with self-
love on the ground that God is Agape and altruism is the image of
God in man? The imago dei reflects God's nature as a creative
being in terms of man's capacity for continual self-transcendence.
It also reflects God's nature as righteousness in terms of man's
inalienable sense of right, his "categorical imperative." It also re
flects God's eternity of being in terms of man's abiHty to abso
lutize. The imago dei also reflects God's nature as truth in man's
capacity to think, i. e., to operate with abstract ideas and to make
logical inferences. But all of these aspects of the imago dei are
summarized in God's nature as trinity, where God within His very
nature is the prototype of all community, and in God's outgoing
creative love whereby His eternal purpose is to create a new people
for Himself. Agape as trinity and as outgoing love are intrinsi-
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cally contained within God's reality as Agape, as eternal, right
eous, veridical and creative, communicative being.
All operations of God are aspects of His nature as Agape and
cannot be understood correctly except in terms of this truth. Possi
bly we might also include within the imago dei man's glory over
creation, even as God's glory is above and beyond all else. Some
Old Testament scholars like Mowinckel use the Eighth Psalm as the
basis for such an interpretation. We do this gladly provided that
the power and glory of God and of man are the expressions of their
creative love and are not interpreted in invidious terms.
The reason that man can never be happy apart from full soc
iety, apart from the community of Christ or the Church, is that
the image of God in man demands that the individual find a new
level of community where he is not cancelled out but fulfilled.
Selflessness and selfishness must both be corrected into self-fulness
in fellowship. The natural man never having experienced such com
munion in Christ cannot even understand, of course, such motiva
tion and fulfilment. It is existentially foolishness or offense to
him, but to those who believe, it is the power of God unto salvation.
Self-love in the old terms has thus no meaning, for a new self is
found through the losing of self, but the self, as we have said,
becomes neither selfish nor selfless but selfful.
Christian ethics can find its fulfilment only through man's
being born again within the new community of the Church of
Christ, through man's becoming actually a new creature in Christ.
The very direction and content of the will must be changed. The
reason that the Christian faith is often not real in educational insti
tutions is all too frequently due to a lack of real Christian under
standing, teaching and experience. Man is a sinner who must be
saved by grace, but this necessity is itself the very essence of the
grace of God in creation. The need for salvation as a free gift
and for motivation through maturation within the love of God
is God's pedagogical grace. To say this is not to make light of sin,
it is to accept its reality in the light of God's sovereign purpose and
grace ; it is to see reality in the perspective of God's eternal will
and not in terms of man's actual state whether as a static or as a
striving human being.
I am afraid that little space is left for the relation of the imago
dei and sanctification. Our liberal friends have often acted as
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though unaided nurture could change nature. They have not un
derstood or stressed the difference between man's actual and es
sential nature, and the pedagogical reason for the interactions.
between the two. They have not been happy about the fact that
man as a sinner must be born again. They have felt that such an
anthropology reflects unworthily on God. To be sure they have done
much good work in stressing that man's essential nature is from
God. They have also been strong in their emphasis on education
for life. Ethics needs education both before and after conversion.
Evangelism is thin and fugitive without adequate education. To.
neglect the need for regeneration, however, is to neglect precisely
the way itself by means of which the reality of the Agape of God
fills the reflection of altruism in the imago dei.
Much neo-orthodox as well as much older theology has neg
lected the necessary understanding and acceptance of sanctifica
tion. Sanctification is the process whereby the reality of Agape
reshapes man's nature, maturing his mind, reconstituting man's
feelings, and empowering his will with Christian concern. Sancti
fication is growth in grace. Man becomes a new creature not only
as a justified sinner but as a moral agent. To whittle down the
doctrine of sanctification is to cut the nerve of Christian ethics.
The act of conversion, on whatever manner, gives man a new
direction of attention and affection. The process of conversion
strengthens the direction and intensifies the affections, as well as.
clarifying the direction and purifying the affections.
Man's will is also increasingly vitalized and habituated with
Christian concern. Sanctification is the completion of man's natur
alization as a citizen of heaven. I believe that this process may
contain critical turnings or infillings, but I believe that it must
always start with conversion and always continue until man is
translated into the heavenly Kingdom of God's love. The imago'
dei remains the restless seeker even after conversion as an act,,
and requires that it be fulfilled within the process of the com
munity reality which is God's eternal purpose for the world.
Sanctification means the increasing fulfilment of man's need
for God and men within the Agape relationship. The community in
Christ, as a reality, comes first. Man longs by his deepest nature
for this community and finds his deepest satisfactions within it.
Sanctification is, therefore, first of all Christ's work in us. It i?;
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due to the power of the Holy Spirit in purifying and guidance.
The primary aspect of sanctification is Godward. Sanctification is
secondarily defined in terms of whatever effects and fosters
Christian community. Mores are of secondary importance. Whether
to eat or not to eat, to drink or not to drink are not matters of
primary significance, as the New Testament strongly stresses, but
rather whether the whole self under God seeks with mind, heart,
and will for God's will to be done for Christian fellowship. To
the pure all things as externals are pure. They are to be judged
entirely by man's attitude towards them and the consequences of
his use of them. The term sanctificaiion has unfortunately come
to mean a pious moralism of manners rather than the remaking
and the redirection of the whole life by the love of God which
overcomes the brittleness and critical attitudes of moralism. Those
who make external manners important as such are by that token
strangers to Christian sanctification. He alone is sanctified who
longs and accepts with his whole life the love of God and within
its power seeks to win others for that community which is in Christ.
But sanctification results in the fruits of the Spirit where a
new kind of community is actually affected. By their fruits ye shall
know them. Carelessness is itself lack of care and very likely of
love. There is an inner discipline in sanctification which seems stern
to the outsider but is rather the spontaneous demands of the pure
love of God within. The Gospel is at the same time no moralism
hard to bear, but, rather, a freedom within which Christ has set
us free and also cleanses us of impurities. Unless Christians differ
in thought, heart and will from the world, Christianity is a fake.
The Gospel is a power unto salvation as newness of life. An out
pouring of the Spirit will surely affect a new puritanism of life,
where the religious essentials take primary place, not as a matter
of solemn and unpleasant duty, but as the joyful living within the
community of Christian concern. When the Gospel fills us with
all joy and peace in believing, the substitute pleasures of worldly
life lose their attraction and the world's source of pleasure dries
tip. Calvinism and pietism, two great Christian forces, were both
puritanical. I think there is a fuller puritanism awaiting the world
where the ways of the world are left for the walking in the ways
of the Lord with more joy and creative daring than the world ever
dreamed was possible.
